Law\u27s Constitution: A Relational Critique by Nourse, Victoria
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2002 
Law's Constitution: A Relational Critique 
Victoria Nourse 
Georgetown Law Center, vfn@law.georgetown.edu 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 13-036 
 
 




17 Wis. Women's L.J. 23-56 (2002) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons 
LAW'S CONSTITUTION: A RELATIONAL CRITIQUE 
Victoria F. Nourse* 
It is a simple fact: we begin from others. Without others we, quite 
literally, could not live, feel, be born. Every mother, every mother's 
partner, every father, every child, knows this. But law sees these rela-
tions as something lesser, as foreign. Mention the word "relationship" 
to the average lawyer and she will likely assume that you are talking 
about sex, dating, or perhaps marriage. She may even wonder what 
"relationship" has to do with the law at all. 1 
In this paper, I wonder whether it is possible to flip that equation, 
to think of the relational as central, rather than peripheral, to law's most 
ambitious public projects. My hypothesis is two-fold: first, that the rela-
tional question is known by, and important to, feminism; and, second, 
that the relational is important beyond feminism, indeed that it is im-
portant to our ideas of constitution and law itself. If this is right, then 
focusing on relationships is far from the marginal project that it is 
often assumed to be. Indeed, it may allow feminism to predict new 
ways of seeing law. I cannot prove any or all of that here; all I can do is 
offer examples from my own legal experience2 - in criminal law and 
constitutional law - that show what I will call (for lack of a better 
term) the "relational critique." What I mean by this is two things: (1) 
* Victoria F. Nourse, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. Spe-
cial thanks to Jane Larson, K.T. Albiston, and Tonya Brito for their comments on this 
paper and to Mary Becker for her important and inspiring work. Neither this paper, 
nor this conference, would have been possible without the hard work and enthusiasm 
of many, but most notably, that of Tonya Brito. Finally, my thanks to the editors of 
the Wisconsin Women's Law Journal for their patience and to Sarah Ivory for her excel-
lent research assistance. 
1. Intimacy goes by the legal name of privacy and, if considered governable at all, 
is left to the purportedly lesser disciplines. Law tends to reproduce this idea in its 
classifications of legal knowledge, making "family law" seem less important than "con-
stitutional law" for example, even though it is likely that no state could exist without 
the family. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MoTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 23-24 (1995) (criticizing the scholarly ten-
dency that tends to treat "those relationships conceptually contained in the private 
sphere [as) receiving little sustained critical attention except as they relate to the 
public domain."). It is even complained that these kind of relations (known again as 
"family law") are relegated to the lesser within feminist theory. !d. at 23 ("[T]he family 
has been only marginally evident in legal theory or jurisprudence, including feminist 
legal theory.") 
2. Because I gather very disparate examples, I unfortunately find myself citing to 
my own work more than I would like. The arguments I set forth below about constitu-
tional structure and criminal law are unconventional within their own disciplines and, 
therefore, I feel compelled to point the reader to the other materials for a full sense 
of the argument in each case. 
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that many of the concepts that we see in law, that seem mundane, 
natural or given, stand as proxies for normative relations; (2) that by 
disaggregating the natural object- by seeing relations in naturalized 
descriptions - we can see the law creating/ generating/ constituting. 
Put another way, this paper is about thinking relationally - I am won-
dering whether it is possible or wise to substitute the "relational" ques-
tion for the "sameness" question or the "difference" question - not 
only in cases of concern to feminists but cases elsewhere in the law. 
The examples that follow are ones of public law, but they do not 
seem, at first, to be that. I study the everyday within the law; indeed, I 
study ideas that seem so mundane and natural that they don't seem 
legal at all - ideas like passion and time and blood. Real life, and 
reading hundreds of cases, have taught me that the natural in the law 
is quite unnatural, quite "made" in the image of human relations, and 
that this is not simply a theoretical trope, that this "madeness" is quite 
real and demonstrable. Perhaps more importantly, it has convinced 
me that no theory oflaw can be complete without accounting for law's 
constitutive/ creative aspects. 3 It is in this sense that the "relational 
move" should be understood - as a way of disaggregating the natural 
and, in the process, showing us law's generativity, its natality. 4 To bor-
row a phrase, it is an attempt to "uncover the laws of motion of a 
system" that seems to find inferiority and oppression in nature.5 
I recognize, of course, that the relational and the constitutive 
(terms I use throughout this paper) have larger meanings within the 
law and legal scholarship. Each bears scholarly connotations, some of 
which I readily accept and others I just as readily reject.6 Relational 
concepts are at least as conventional as Madison and Hohfeld and 
Black,7 as feminist as West and Becker and MacKinnon,8 as historical 
3. For a discussion of the meaning of "constitutive," see infra note 10. 
4. Feminism cannot accept, in my view, the traditional positivist model of law as 
command or some less apparently forceful pedigree view of that idea. Instead, it must 
have a notion of law that it is at least partially constitutive, constitutive in the following 
sense - that law creates relationships both within legal rules themselves and in the 
world. Note that I am not arguing for a view of law that is only constitutive, but for 
one that is at least partly constitutive. 
5. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY oF THE STATE 241 
(1989). 
6. For example, relational contracting is defined, as I understand it, as a long-
term ongoing relationship. My concept of relational does not depend upon temporal-
ity or the longevity of the relationship. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations 
in Business: A Preliminary Study, AM. Soc. REv. 28 (1963) (studying the ways in which 
long-term relationships affect our understanding of real life contracting); see also Eliz-
abeth Mertz, An Afterword: Tapping the Promise of Relational Contract Theory - 'Real' Legal 
Language and a New Legal Realism, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 909 (2000). 
7. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 Qames Madison) (assuming and describing the 
political relations at stake in constructing a government); Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fun-
damental Legal Conceptions as Applied in judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16 (1913) (disag-
gregating rights into an elaborate set of relations of opposites and correlatives); 
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969) 
(using the relational to describe the structural features of our constitution). 
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and social as Hurst and Gordon and Macaulay.9 The constitutive finds 
homes in disciplines as widely disparate as philosophy, feminist the-
ory, critical legal studies, social theory and legal history. 10 But this, to 
me, is the beauty of the project, as well as its risk. The risk is of course 
that I will be taken to mean something other than what I am saying; 
8. Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Feminism: Toward a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 21 (relying on the patriarchal relation of men to each other as a spring-
board for a substantive theory of feminism); MAcKINNON, supra note 5, at 100 ("Power 
is a social relation."); Robin West, jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 4 
(1988) ("But the gap between legal theory's descriptions of human nature and wo-
men's true nature also presents a conceptual obstacle to the development of feminist 
jurisprudence: jurisprudence must be about the relationship of human beings to law 
... ") (emphasis in original). 
9. jAMES WILLARD HuRST, LAw AND THE CoNDITIONs OF FREEDOM: IN THE NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956) (opening this set of lectures with the "mutual 
assistance" arrangement entered into by Wisconsin settlers as a reflection of working 
principles of the everyday legal order and considering, at various points, the nature 
and closeness of mutual relations in assessing the law's impact); Robert W. Gordon, 
Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 103 (1984) ("[I]n practice, it is just about 
impossible to describe any set of 'basic' social practices without describing the legal 
relations among the people involved .... ");Macaulay, supra note 6. 
10. The idea of the "constitutive" arises in tile philosophical literature, JoHN R. 
SEARLE, SPEECH AcTs: AN EssAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 33 (1969) ("constitu-
tive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior"), and 
more recently in social theory, see ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: 
OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION 18 (1984) ("(r]ules relate on the one 
hand to the constitution of meaning, and on the other to the sanctioning of modes of 
social conduct"). Within legal circles, there appear many meanings. For example, 
there is an ongoing debate within jurisprudence about the meaning of constitutive 
rules. See JosEPH RAz, PRACTICAL REAsoN AND NoRMs 108-111 (1990) (disputing 
Searle's notion that constitutive rules are really distinct from regulative rules). At the 
same time, the constitutive has been an important part of critical movements, such as 
critical legal studies, feminism and, more generally, the law and society movement. 
Gordon, supra note 9, at 106 ("Understanding the constitutive role of law in social 
relationships is often crucial not only in characterizing societies but in accounting for 
major social change."); ARTHUR McEvoY, THE FISHERMAN's PROBLEM: EcoLOGY AND 
LAw IN THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980 13-14 (1986) ("People not only exist as 
part of their natural environment but also comprehend that environment in socially 
and historically contingent ways. In turn, by acting on the basis of that comprehen-
sion in a responsive environment, they help create the world in their own image."); see 
also Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Editorial Introduction, in LAw IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
10-11 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993) (contrasting and seeking to rec-
oncile "instrumentalist" and "constitutive" views of law in everyday life); John Brig-
ham, The Constitution of Interests, Institutionalism, CLS, and New Approaches to Sociolegal 
Studies, 10 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 421 (1998). Meanwhile, conventional constitutional 
scholars regularly write of the document as "constitutive." See Laurence H. Tribe, Tak-
ing Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 108 HAAv. L. REv. 1221, 1235 (1995). Perhaps some of this is now converging: 
recently, Julie Nice has provided an important addition to this scholarship by urging a 
co-constitutive approach toward equal protection law, a stance that brings law and 
society scholarship to bear on a traditional constitutional topic. See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, 
Equal Protection's Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive Approach, 85 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 1392, 1393 (2000) (arguing that a "co-constitutive approach transcends equal 
protection's anti nomic discourse"). 
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that I will be assigned to a camp from which I do not hail (I devote 
Part III to some potential misunderstandings). But the beauty is that 
the relational may well offer connections between different viewpoints 
in ways that are potentially fruitful or interesting.11 
I do not aim to locate the relational in a given tradition (other 
than one that is broadly realist) .12 Instead, I am trying to take a con-
cept feminism has revealed to me, indeed, that is necessary to my fem-
inism and see whether it might reach beyond feminism's traditional 
borders. I hope it has something to say about how pain and suffering 
and oppression are thought, how good men and women can live in a 
world where hate and oppression are part of the natural order of 
things. What follows has profited enormously from the work of my 
colleagues (Wisconsinites present and past) ;13 however, any mistakes 
or pretensions are my own. This is but my mosaic, based on my expe-
rience. It is an investigation in the mechanics of law's creation - in 
how time, blood and passion can, when found in the law, come to be 
so very unnatural. 
In the first part of this paper, I set forth the context in which the 
relational has emerged in feminism and how I understand the more 
general notion of the "relational" in this paper. In the second part, I 
examine three different issues that reveal a similar dynamic - one 
dealing with self-defense law, the other with the law of honor de-
11. For example, my subject matter - the study of doctrine - is quite conven-
tional and yet I am using tools and ideas borrowed from various unconventional 
places. I take the rules seriously, if you will, but with an altered angle of vision. For 
those who find contradiction in this, let me just say that a theory of law is not a theory 
of law application and that it is possible to believe quite consistently that there are 
rules but that they are not self-applying. That the law is not fully autonomous does 
not mean that law does not, as a practice, have its own conventions and vocabularies, 
its own practice. Indeed, we have spilled too much ink debating this as an either/or 
proposition; in this sense, realism and positivism have always needed each other. The 
important point is not that they do, but how they do. 
12. Realism connotes many different legal positions. See Victoria F. Nourse, Mak-
ing Constitutional Doctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1401, 1403 n.6 (1997) 
[hereinafter Nourse, Constitutional]. I confess a certain partiality to the empirical phi-
losophy of John Dewey and the history of Willard Hurst and a certain distaste for 
modern summaries of the realist project. What follows focuses on what I call the rela-
tional strain of realism, not one that has been emphasized much in conventional ac-
counts, even by those who both admire realism and emphasize relations. See MARTHA 
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, ExcLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw 
(1990) (emphasizing realism and noting some of its relational components but giving 
a rather broad, modern, account of realism). See e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Non-
sense and the functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 809, 827 (1935) (quoting with 
approval a discussion of the "neo-realistic" approach which departs "entirely from the 
subject-predicate form of logic, and employ[s] a logic of relations .... Instead of 
treating a legal concept as a substance which in its nature necessarily contains certain 
inherent properties"). 
13. I make reference here, in particular, to the work of Stewart Macaulay, Jane 
Larson, Beth Mertz, Art McEvoy, Bob Gordon and, of course, Willard Hurst. I am 
particularly thankful to Jane Larson for providing helpful assistance on the question 
of the constitutive in the law and society movement. 
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fenses, and finally, an ancient controversy about the sterilization of 
habitual criminals. In each case, I seek to demonstrate that the stan-
dard arguments turn on ideas of the "natural"- whether time, passion 
or blood- and that these arguments take on new meaning if we come 
to see the "natural" as a proxy for normative relations. Only then can 
we begin to see how the law "constitutes" itself, how it may change 
even while appearing to stay the same. In the final part, I suggest some 
avenues of inquiry should my hypothesis prove accurate in other 
venues. 
I. IDENTriY AND RELATION IN FEMINISM: THE CONTEXT 
Feminism has, for much of the past twenty years, struggled with 
questions of identity. Who are we? Who should we be? Are we differ-
ent? Are we the same? Or, so, goes the refrain. The debates about 
sameness and difference, subordination and caring, have exacted a 
toll. Internecine warfare has left theory lurching toward the incom-
prehensible and the practice and politics (real life politics that is) all 
but completely neglected. The inevitable recourse to identity has al-
ways seemed to me to be something of a diversion; by this, I do not 
mean that identity is not important as an intellectual matter. Our un-
derstanding of ourselves as agents in the world, as something other 
than what people have defined us as, is essential to imagining justice 
and political action on behalf of women. 14 
And, yet, by focusing on concepts of identity, the argument has a 
tendency to spiral inward, to Invite crude caricatures, to focus us on 
our attributes rather than our actions, ourselves rather than our rela-
tions with others (men, women or children) .15 Indeed, the identity 
debates have seemed to occlude the rather straightforward possibility 
that we are both "the same" and "different;" and, more importantly, 
that this "sameness-and-difference" depends upon the relations in 
which we stand. We are mothers and workers, we are students and 
teachers, we are both inferior and equal, oppressed and emancipated, 
in different ways at different times, dynamically and secretly and so 
openly that no one cares.16 In my view- and this indeed is the point 
14. This should not be taken as a claim that individuality is unimportant. It is 
simply that I believe, as Hannah Arendt once said, that there is a difference between 
the "who" of identity and the "what" of identity. The "what" of identity finds identity 
residing in qualities and thus invites both reduction and oppression. The "who" ar-
rives in the midst of life's conditions, which are the conditions of activities with other 
people, and, in my view, anticipates the possibility of emancipation (the ability to 
"begin anew" as Arendt would put it). HANNAH ARENDT, THE HuMAN CoNDITION 179, 
181 (1958); on this topic, see juLIA KrusTEVA, HANNAH ARENDT 171-74 (2001). 
15. There is always the danger that our primary aim in focusing on ourselves, 
willed or unconscious, is simply to reproduce our own particular likeness. This is what 
I take to be the core of the essentialism critique. 
16. This kind of insight is hardly new. It appears in a broad variety of work. See, 
e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, No CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LAmEs: WoMEN AND TI-IE OBLI-
GATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 310 (1998) ("[l)n [the) Anglo-American legal tradition, 
28 WISCONSIN WOM.E,'N'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:23 
of the paper - the descriptive question of identity (whether our labels 
correspond with reality) is less important than the relational question 
(how law and life generate and transform relations) .17 
To shift the inquiry toward the relational is, of course, to invoke a 
term that has a history and various connotations within feminism. 
Mary Becker has recently given us a new and important version of 
"relational feminism," one which begins from the provocative stance 
that gender is constructed by men's relation to other men (not wo-
men) and concludes that, to counter patriarchy, feminism must em-
phasize a contrary set of values or relations. 18 Becker's work, along 
with that of Robin West (on whom Becker relies) has, to my mind, 
done us a great service by elevating relations to a point where they can 
be considered, not dismissed as lesser and unimportant. I agree that 
relations cannot be assumed as invariably ones of domination and that 
feminism must see the relational as quite complex. 19 And, yet, my 
own understandings20 proceed from a different place. I do not pro-
ceed from a theory of gender or sex or patriarchy. I have no big theo-
equality has always meant simultaneously common law and equity, sameness and dif-
ference shaped to authentic equality in the world which living people inhabit."); 
CHANTAL MouFFE, Feminism, Citizenship and Radical Democratic Politics, in FEMINISTS 
THEORIZE THE PoLITICAL 369, 372 Q. Butler&]. Scott eds. 1992) ("A single individual 
can be ... dominant in one relation while subordinated in another."); see also BoA VEN-
TURA DE SousA SANTOS, TowARD A NEw COMMON SENSE 408-09 ("there are therefore, 
capacitating and incapacitating differences, as there are capacitating and incapacitat-
ing equalities"). 
17. The classic feminist emphasis on rights, which generated some of the early 
sameness/ difference debate, is a good example of how an abstract concept defined by 
reference to an implicit object metaphor may perpetuate that metaphor. At least 
since Hohfeld, there have been compelling arguments that a right is not a singular 
object, but a relation. To use a more modern, feminist source, see IRis MARION 
YOUNG, jUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 25 (1990) ("Rights are not fruitfully 
conceived as possessions. Rights are relationships, not things; they are institutionally 
defined rules specifying what people can do in relation to one another. Rights refer 
to doing more than having, to social relationships that enable or constrain action."); 
see also Jennifer Nedelsky, The Practical Possibilities of Ji'eminist Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 
1286, 1289 (1993) ("Rights define and structure relationships of power, of responsi-
bility, and of trust.") 
18. Becker, supra note 8, at 21 (urging a "relational feminism" as a variation on 
cultural feminism); see id. at 23-25 (relying on arguments that "male distrust and fear 
of other men" is "patriarchy's core motivating force."). 
19. See RoBIN WEsT, CARING FOR jUSTICE 35-36 (1997) (arguing, for example, that 
caregiving is moral, not simply emotional, work, and that it should not be seen as 
opposed to but constitutive of justice). 
20. Let me hasten to add that I have been influenced in my thinking on this 
question by a variety of work that reflects quite different views on questions of gender. 
See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 12 (proposing a social relations approach to questions of 
difference); West, supra note 8 (explaining legal theory's embedded claims of separa-
tion); Nedelsky, supra note 17 (emphasizing the relational structure of autonomy 
claims); MAcKINNON, supra note 5 (unearthing forced relations and domination in 
legal theory and jurisprudence); Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerog-
ative and Privacy, 105 YALE LJ. 2117 (1996) (elaborating a history of transformation 
and sustenance of status relations). 
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ries of women or men or their optimal identities; instead, I have some 
working principles about law, principles that come from a place where 
bottom-up meets top-down, where experience meets theory about the 
relation between law and life. 
My claim here is not about identity, then, but about intellectual 
habits and structures - about the way that we think about the mun-
dane, the everyday, the natural in law. My argument is not a claim 
about relational or cultural feminism in the sense that many have in-
terpreted it- I am not arguing about women's essence.21 Nor am I 
arguing for an "ethic of care." It is precisely because I want to con-
sider the relational "in a different key," that I have chosen a broader, 
more abstract definition, one which does not look at relations as inva-
riably enriching or oppressive. My view of the relational then - the 
"relational critique" - is an intellectual action (a way to disaggregate 
the social from the natural in the law). Thus, any real life relation will 
do - it need not be the relation between men and women or women 
and children, it need not be a sexual or an intimate relation, but may 
be the relation between contracting parties, between the members of 
a board of directors and the company's officers, or between voters and 
their public agents. Nor need the relation be obviously healthy or dan-
gerous; it may be a relation of nurturance or oppression, dependence 
or autonomy, agency or embeddedness. The point of the relational is 
not to describe the world so much as to think the world.22 
If the relational concept that I use is, in this sense jurispruden-
tial,23 it is far from the predominant jurisprudential view within the 
academy.24 The conventional view of legal reasoning, one still held by 
the average lawyer and law professor is derived from the old Austinian 
"command of the sovereign" idea of law - law as the command of the 
gun, of the strong against the weak, of the many against the few. 25 
21. Indeed, one of the reasons that I favor the relational notion is that it may be 
applied to a variety of naturalized phenomena. For example, it helps to illuminate 
the ways in which color (whiteness and blackness and brownness), like other appar-
ently natural concepts (time, blood, force), is a "made" relation as well. What I mean 
by this, of course, is that color appears as if it inheres in nature but in fact creates 
complex rules of inferiority and superiority, allegiance and even citizenship. See 
GRAcE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS (1998) (tracing the creation of a white 
racial identity in relation to others). 
22. As Catharine MacKinnon has put it: "In life, 'woman' and 'man' are widely 
experienced as features of being, not constructs of perception, cultural interventions, 
or forced identities. Gender, in other words, is lived as ontology, not as epistemology. 
Law actively participates in this transformation of perspective into being." MAcKIN-
NON, supra note 5, at 237. My aim here is to try to shift the ontological to the episte-
mological, at least momentarily. 
23. See id. ("A jurisprudence is a theory of the relation between life and law."). 
24. Let me hasten to add, however, that I am far from the only person to think 
this way, within feminism or without. For a variety of examples from other scholars, 
see infra Part III, notes 105-11 and accompanying text. 
25. Pedigrees may help us distinguish official norms from social ones but this 
does not account for adjudication at all (law application), and that is where all the 
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This kind of force-as-positivism (strong or weak, conventional or criti-
cal, instrumental or gap-filling) makes several important assumptions 
I think feminism should reject, the most important of which is that we 
should think about law application by searching for the factual ana-
logues of textual/pedigreed descriptions. 26 If realism taught us any-
thing it should have been that this view was insufficient. For some 
realists, the positivist view was insufficient because it eliminated the 
human factor "behind" the law (society's input into law, if you will). 
But, for other realists, the theory was .seen as insufficient because it 
failed to grasp the generative powers of law (law's output both within 
law and society).27 Willard Hurst, I believe, gave life to this in his 
monumental studies of our legal history: Hurst gave us the "release of 
energy,"28 and with it, the notion that law was not simply command, 
but release, was power-as-relation as much as power-as-violence. 
My proposed "working principle" amendment to this realist cri-
tique is simply this: law's generativity can be seen in shifting relations. 
In the examples that follow, law gives birth to relations that did not 
exist before. Let me hasten to add that this generativity may be benefi-
cial but may also be destructive. Law's relations may prize the few over 
the many; they may keep the law standing still even when it is moving 
forward and moving forward when it appears to be standing still. They 
may, as I will try to show, create discrimination (both within and with-
out the law), as well as. expose it. The important point, for me, is to 
describe the mechanics of legal transformation/ constitution in the 
very places that seem so terribly unlegal - in the everyday ideas of the 
natural - in time, passion, and blood. 
II. THE RELATIONAL CRITIQUE A:Nn Pusuc LAw: EXAMPLES 
I begin with my favorite example of why a relational view matters. 
It does not come from the family or dating or sex; it does not concern 
action is (no realist pun intended) in this analysis. The realist critique is not that all 
law is the same as social or customary norms but that law is not completely explained 
without room for the influence of social or customary norms. 
26. Positivism is a theory of law's authority, and a theory by which law may be 
distinguished from social or customary norms. It implies, however, a theory of law 
application which focuses on identifiable public texts. 
27. The output/input opposition is too stark; these processes interact, but it is 
useful here simply as a way of explaining the relevant issues. On this kind of distinc-
tion as too sharp, see Sarat & Kearns, supra note 10. 
28. See, e.g., HuRST, supra note 9, at 6-7. I have recently been struck with the 
degree to which Hurst's "release" corresponds to concepts used by John Dewey who, 
in his empirical philosophy, conceived of language and human association in pre-
cisely these terms: "Language is ... not a mere agency for economizing energy in the 
interaction of human beings. It is a release and amplification of energies that enter 
into it, conferring upon them the added quality of meaning." JoHN DEWEY, ExPERI-
ENCE AND NATURE 144 (1925); see also id. at 145 ("There is, again, nothing new or 
unprecedented in the fact that assemblage of things confers upon the assembly and 
its constituents, new properties by means of unlocking energies hitherto pent in."). 
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women or children or feminism. Instead, it comes from the most obvi-
ously constitutive and public law I know: the United States Constitu-
tion. The standard view of the Constitution - held today by most 
conventional constitutional law scholars, I would add - is a weak, or 
qualified, version of the old- positivist position. The idea is that the 
Constitution is a law (albeit a higher one), that law is command, and 
that command is to be found in the text. Indeed, the dominant ap-
proach toward constitutional interpretation today is known as textual-
ism - a view so dominant that it has become standard even among 
those who purport to find it far too constraining. 29 
Now let us consider what this view does to the most basic of con-
stitutional principles -its structure. The standard constitutional law 
approach is to view structure as a set of legal commands drawn from 
the text - particular texts known as the vesting clauses. 30 The vesting 
clauses describe our government using three of the Constitution's 
most prominent yet opaque terms: the "executive," "legislative," and 
'judicial" powers. These words are thought, in turn, to be the begin-
ning and the end of the matter; because power is naturalized as force, 
these texts are thought to be about as "natural" as the Constitution 
gets. They are so natural, they appear incapable of definition and at 
the same time self-executing. To paraphrase Justice Scalia: executive 
power is executive power is executive power. 31 
Now, perform with me an intellectual experiment.32 Take these 
words - the words that seem so naturally descriptive of our Constitu-
tion's structure (the terms "executive," 'judicial," and "legislative" 
power). Now, cut them out of the Constitution, wipe them out, elimi-
nate them. Throw away the vesting clauses if you will. You may strike 
all these terms and not much will happen. The Congress will still 
meet, the people will still vote, the Supreme Court will still decide 
cases, and the federal government will still be supreme. 33 In short, we 
29. Even if one does not believe in textualism as a final end, it is thought that 
one must begin there. See, e.g., PHILIP BoBBITT, CoNSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CoNSTITUTION (1982) (providing a typology of constitutional argument). 
30. By "vesting clauses," I mean the specific language in the first sentences of the 
provisions of Articles I, II and III, as follows: U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall 
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."); id. art. II, § 1 ("The executive 
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."); id. art. III, § 1 
("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). 
31. I am referring to Justice Scalia's now famous, and newly admired, dissent in 
the independent counsel case, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) ("To re-
peat, Article II, sec. 1, cl. 1 of the Constitution provides: 'The executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States.' . :. [T]his does not mean some of the 
executive power, but all of the executive power.") (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
32. The full experiment and a full explication of this theory appears in Victoria 
F. Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DuKE LJ. 749 (1999). 
33. Since this often comes as a shock to some, I will provide a rather long list of 
specific constitutional references: In Article I, §· 4, cl. 2, the Constitution specifies that 
32 WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:23 
will still have a government. These descriptive words, assumed to be 
the most important and naturalized text in our Constitution,34 do 
nothing in and of themselves. They govern no one. 
Our political order depends not upon the vesting clauses but 
upon the lived political relations inspired by the document's constitu-
tion of representation. I refer here to provisions so anonymous they 
have no special "clause" names, provisions that, at least until recently, 
were largely invisible from a standard textualist's gaze- the electoral 
procedures of Articles I and II. 35 Strike these provisions from the 
Constitution and quite literally, there is no more representation, no 
more President, no more Senate or House. The representational 
"texts," as they are lived, are essential to a republican political order. 36 
Every time we give the representative relation voice - every time we 
vote for a member of the House or the Senate, every time we refrain 
from storming the Capitol in anger, every time we defer to a President 
who is not our preference, we reconstitute and reordain the represen-
tative nature of our constitution and thus, daily recreate, the possibil-
ity, however constrained, of self-government.37 
All of this should be more obvious: the point, after all, of a consti-
tution is to constitute a government in law and in real life. If the point 
"[t]he Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year." See also id. amend. XX. 
The electoral provisions constituting the Congress, and assuming the vote, appear in 
art. I, §§ 2-3 & amend. XVII. The Supreme Court's appointment, tenure, and juris-
diction is provided for outside the initial sentence of that article which "vests" power 
in the courts. See id. art. III, § 2 (detailing the extent of the judicial power); id. art III, 
cl. 1 (providing for the appointment of judges for good behavior); id. art II,§ 2, cl. 2 
(providing for the nomination of Supreme Court justices). The supremacy clause 
appears in art. VI, cl. 2. None of these provisions would be affected by striking the 
vesting clauses in their entirety, where the vesting clauses are defined as I have above. 
34. The reason that I call these terms part of a "naturalized" text, is not only 
because most lawyers use these terms as if they described the world but, also, because 
they are grounded in a naturalized view of political power as physical force. A view of 
our polity in which force is so analogized is, in my mind, quite problematic, given our 
republican (read representative) ideal. My view of power is one based on the relation 
of persons to each other and should be distinguished from a view of power as vio-
lence. On the distinction between violence and political power, see HANNAH ARENDT, 
ON VIOLENCE 35-46, 56 (1969) ("Power and violence are opposites; where the one 
rules absolutely, the other is absent."). 
35. The invisible, nameless, provisions I am referring to are: U.S. CoNST. art. I, 
§§ 2-3 & amend. XVII (providing for the election of members of the House and Sen-
ate); and id. art. II, § 1, cis 2-4 & amend. XII (providing for the election of the 
President). 
36. Don't confuse the term republican with republicanism. Representation is 
the essence of a republic as a form of government distinct from aristocracy and direct 
democracy. 
37. I do not mean by this to valorize the particular representational scheme im-
plied by our constitution. I find it very interesting, for example, that Mary Becker has 
recently called feminists' attention to the notion of representation, and its transfor-
mation, as essential to changing politics to benefit women. See Becker, supra, note 8, at 
60-81 (urging major changes in forms of representation as the kind of "systemic 
change" necessary to move toward a less patriarchal culture). 
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is obvious, it is also powerfully illustrative of "the relational critique." 
The Constitution's descriptions of naturalized power- the terms execu-
tive, judicial, legislative - do very little in the world; it is constitutional 
relations (political relations between citizens and their government 
and between different parts of the government) that do all the work, 
both in law and in life. My point is both obvious and worth restating: 
relationships are central to our most public law; indeed they are cen-
tral to the notion of constitutional power in a democracy. 38 
If this is right, then the average lawyer's understanding of a rela-
tionship as sex or dating or marriage is far from complete. The rela-
tional cannot be relegated to the private and ungovernable; law's 
relations are not only about the family or intimacy or even contracts. 
Relations inhere, and indeed constitute, self-government. Put in 
other words, to the extent feminism is concerned with relations, it is 
not concerned with something marginal, other, something to be dis-
missed-as-sex, but something extraordinarily important to the most 
public of laws. I have demonstrated this, however, not by simply as-
serting, as we have known for some time, the intersection of the pub-
lic and the private, but by disaggregating the natural into the 
relational. This is the intellectual move I repeat below. 
A. The Relational Critique and Feminism 
Feminism, laced with a bit of John Dewey's realism, taught me 
this intellectual move. But to see that, let me now shift venues and talk 
about issues that are again a matter of public law, but this time closer 
to traditional feminist concerns. The examples will be drawn from 
traditional materials (doctrine), but from an untraditional perspec-
tive. When I study doctrine, I do not study it to see what the cases 
hold, but to find doctrine's patterned irrationalities,39 irrationalities 
that reveal something about the rules' commitments to real life (rules-
in-reverse). To do that, I study concepts that do not appear to be 
about law at all (for example, time, blood, and passion). I begin with 
two examples from criminal law that resonate with standard feminist 
subjects - one that concerns the idea of "time" and the law of self-
defense and the other the idea of "passion" and the law of provoca-
tion. I close with a brief history of the constitutional status of blood, to 
show how this kind of "relation-think," might be of use in other, more 
standard, constitutional controversies. 
38. See ARENDT, supra note 34, at 44 (' [W]hen we say of somebody that he is 'in 
power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act 
in their name."). 
39. Although I emphasize particular cases below, my research in the criminal law 
is typically based on patterns of caselaw; the claims made below with respect to "immi-
nence" depend upon a study involving hundreds of cases, as does the comparative 
assessment of the law of "passion." 
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1. Time 
There seems no more "natural" concept used by the law than 
time. Few lawyers however would stop to consider "time" a legal con-
cept. And, yet, if one thinks about it for more than a moment, time 
does play quite a common role in the law.40 And, in my field, the 
criminal law, time has come, quite literally, to construct the debate 
about women and the law of self-defense.41 
The self-defense debate goes something like this. Battered wo-
man cases are typically thought not to satisfy the "objective" rules of 
self-defense. They are thought to fail the rules because of time: the 
battered woman's case is imagined as a case in which the victim kills 
her husband during a lull in the fight or when he is asleep. Therefore, 
the argument goes, battered woman cases tend to fail what is known as 
the "imminence" rule: that a defender must respond to an imminent 
threat. Imminence is, in turn, defined by reference to the clock: vio-
lence must be now, not too soon or too late, immediate. Time, then, 
becomes the basis on which traditional scholars rely to argue that bat-
tered women are generally asking for special favors, a subjective stan-
dard, or a special defense.42 
There are a number of problems with the conventional argu-
ment, not the least of which is that it appears to be based on a false 
factual claim - it may be that most battered woman self-defense cases, 
are not, in fact, cases that involve a significant time lag.43 But what I 
am concerned with here is to show how the meaning of time operates 
within this argument. If one actually looks at appellate cases that use 
the term "imminent," one finds that the law's idea of time is far from 
the objective, clock-like certainty upon which the conventional argu-
ment depends. First of all, one finds that "imminence" appears as a 
legal term as often in cases where there is no actual time lag as in 
cases where there is a proverbial '~lull in the action." And, not surpris-
ingly, given these facts, one finds that time takes on other meaning. It 
40. Rules of "imminence," for example appear in a variety of legal contexts. For 
one example, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (requiring, in 
standing law, that plaintiff have suffered an invasion of a legally-protected interest 
which is ... "actual or imminent."). An important recent exception to the idea that 
time is typically ignored is Jed Rubenfeld's book on the constitution. See JED 
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME (2001). 
41. What follows is a summary of a fuller argument that appears in Victoria F. 
Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1235 (2001) [hereinafter 
Nourse, Subjectivity]. 
42. To see the standard argument on imminence, see George P. Fletcher, Domi-
nation in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 553, 561 (1996) 
("[I]mminence, necessity, and proportionality- speak to the objective characteristics 
of self-defense claims"). 
43. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions 
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 388-401 (1991); see also Nourse, 
Subjectivity, supra note 41, at 1246-48 (challenging the view that imminence as a con-
cept only arises in non-confrontational cases). 
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turns out that imminence means many things in the law of self-de-
fense; it is a placeholder - it may borrow from associated norms within 
the law of self-defense as well as social norms relevant to the particular 
parties in the case.44 
Let us look at a single case that makes the point rather clearly: 
Mrs. Watson was down on the ground, fighting for her life.45 The 
state's own witnesses said so.46 They said that, when she shot, her at-
tacker had her around the neck; the witnesses said that she was strug-
gling when the gun fired. 47 All of the elements of self-defense 
appeared to be met: there was an unlawful threat, the threat was 
grave, and it was imminent. The trial judge had a different idea; he 
denied Mrs. Watson's claim of self-defense. Why? This woman was not 
asking for a special favor, a subjective standard, or Lenore Walker to 
take the stand. This was real self-defense, by the book. But the trial 
judge found that the threat was not "imminent," that there was too 
much time.48 
Now, even the most untutored student of the law of self-defense 
must ask how any trial judge can come to the conclusion that a woman 
who is down on the ground struggling has no claim of self-defense.49 
To speak of imminence in the context of such a case is the equivalent 
of legal irrationality. Imminence could not have been an issue in Mrs. 
Watson's case- the hands were around her neck; there was no time to 
call the police or to run away.50 The actual threat was "now"; it was 
"immediate." Well, the sad, but true answer to this quandary is that 
the threat was not imminent, according to the trial judge, because "of 
the parties' relationship involving 'a long course of physical abuse.' "51 
44. See Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note 41, at 1246-48, 1252-56. 
45. Commonwealth v. Watson, 431 A.2d 949, 951 (Pa. 1981) (relating eyewitness 
testimony that the victim had the defendant "around" the neck or was on top of her 
when she shot; trial court finds no imminent threat, a finding reversed on appeal). 
46. ld. 
47. The appellate court reported the testimony of the defendant and a friend 
who was walking thirty to forty feet behind the defendant and the victim. The friend, 
testifying for the state, reported that the victim, Mr. Black, "hit [Watson], knocked 
her down and jumped on top of her before the shooting." The friend stated: "I know 
one time he got her around the neck some kind of way or another. And that's when I 
heard the shots, when he got her around the neck." ld. 
48. The appellate court emphasized the centrality of imminence to the trial 
court's reasoning and to the case: "The central issue in this case stems from the trial 
court's finding that appellant's belief- that she was in imminent danger of death or 
great bodily harm at the time of the shooting - was unreasonable." ld. (emphasis 
added). 
49. Ultimately Mrs. Watson's conviction was overturned on appeal. ld. 
50. ld. (Eyewitnesses testified that the victim had the defendant "around" the 
neck or was on top of her when she shot.). 
51. ld. The appellate court made clear that it rejected the trial court's logic, stat-
ing that "A woman whose husband has repeatedly subjected her to physical abuse 
does not, by choosing to maintain her family relationship with that husband and their 
children, consent to or assume the risk of further abuse." I d. This, of course, implies 
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Put another way, the threat was not imminent because Mrs. Watson 
was a battered woman. 
The important point is not to dismiss this case as an oddity, ulti-
mately reversed on appeal, but to consider its irrationality.52 If time 
was not a real issue, then imminence had to have another meaning for 
this trial judge, and it did: it meant something about Watson's prior 
relationship with her husband. Notice what happens: time, an appar-
ently brute fact about the world, takes on meaning - a meaning bor-
rowed not from the law but from social life (her prior relationship). 
Time is no longer about the clock, but about social and legal norms 
about Mrs. Watson's relation to her husband- that she should have 
left. In this transformation, law (imminence) is quite literally consti-
tuted, it is made in the image of a particular kind of relational norm 
(she should have left) even though it purports to be about the clock. 
Criminal law scholars are likely to find this quite odd, since (as I 
have explained elsewhere) the idea that imminence has a meaning 
challenges many of the assumptions on which the debate about self-
defense is constructed. 53 But it will come as no surprise to law and 
society scholars, and others, that even the most apparently objective of 
rules - in this case, time - may absorb social norms (nor that this 
happens in many self-defense cases, not simply ones affecting battered 
women).54 Long ago, realism taught us that legal concepts are not 
autonomous, created out of nowhere, and that law absorbs social 
norms and vice-versa. We also know that, by masking these norms, 
within a purportedly objective, natural guise, the guise of "time," the 
law tends to legitimate the existing order. We know that from critical 
legal studies. But what we don't know, or if we know we have not paid 
sufficient attention to, is the mechanics of law's constitution (the "how" it 
happens as opposed to "that" it happens). The kind of thing we have 
failed to note are the ways in which relations constitute the natural 
and, in turn, naturalize relations. 
It is one thing for members of society to tacitly share a social 
norm that women should leave violent relationships. But transformed 
quite strongly that the appellate court interpreted the trial court's remarks in just the 
way I have, as a statement that she should have left before the confrontation. 
52. My study shows that this kind of "patterned irrationality" is not limited to 
Watson's case. Her case is unusual in a number of respects but not in the sense in 
which imminence tends to take on meaning, act as a placeholder, in a vast number of 
cases, cases that involve both male and female defendants. See Nourse, Subjectivity, 
supra note 41, at 1255-56. 
53. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 42, at 556 ("[t]he requirement of imminence 
means that the time for defense is now. The defender cannot wait any longer."); WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw§ 5.7(d) at 495 (reporting that force is imminent if it will 
occur "almost immediately"); jOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 206 
(2d. ed. 1995) (imminent violence must be "upon the instant" or "at once."). 
54. My survey was not limited to battered woman's cases but, instead, encom-
passed all self-defense cases in which imminence appeared as a term of relevance 
during a set period of time. 
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into law, and in particular into self-defense law, the institution 
changes the legal relations implicit in the norm. The neighbor who 
says over the fence "she really should leave him," is not the judge or 
jury who appropriates that norm within the institution we know as law. 
When we move from time as brute fact to institutional norm, we move 
from a natural context to an institutional context, a context that is 
quite complex, subject to its own internal norms and bound by a set of 
self-regarding institutional imperatives. 55 Once a judge takes that leav-
ing-norm and places it within the legal institution, the norm gains 
hard edges; it becomes a category of up or down, in or out; it gains 
power - it takes on the characteristics of the institution in which it is 
placed. A perceived social obligation imposed on a defendant be-
comes a measure of legal right and wrong, it becomes a measure of 
hard and fast exclusion. It thus becomes the way in which a battered 
woman can be refused a defense because she was battered, but more 
importantly, it becomes a way to naturalize discrimination, to give it the 
legitimacy of law. 56 
It takes the relational to see precisely how a social leaving-norm 
comes to be embedded in the natural. Imagine a different relation 
than the one presented in Watson's case: between male strangers, for 
example, who frequent a bar in which violent fights erupt every Satur-
day night. There is no rule in the law of self-defense that these per-
sons must avoid that bar (that they should leave even before the fight) 
- even though they know that another fight will inevitably happen. 
Imagine that the Watson case takes place between a woman who kills a 
well-armed stranger who she sees from across the room. There is no 
rule that she has to leave because he walks toward her. When, in ei-
ther case, the defendants end up struggling with their attackers, the 
judge will not say "you, defendant should have left the scene." Indeed, 
the law of self-defense has always provided breathing room for free 
action even when the defendant knows of a high likelihood of poten-
tial violence. It is not the law, then, but the rules of intimate relation 
that create the legal rules that govern Mrs. Watson's case. 
55. Institutions tend to "think" in terms that replicate basic questions about their 
identities. See MARY DouGlAS, How INSTITUTIONS THINK 112 (1986)("Any institution 
that is going to keep its shape needs to gain legitimacy by distinctive grounding in 
nature and in reason: then it affords to its members a set of analogies with which to 
explore the world and with which to justifY the naturalness and reasonableness of the 
instituted rules ... It provides the categories of their thought, sets the terms for self-
knowledge, and fixes identities."). 
56. This rule of time is, in effect, a rule of pre-retreat - it is a rule that says that 
you must leave before the knife is above your head. (On the difference between a pre-
retreat and a retreat rule, see Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note 41, at 1284-85). To apply 
a pre-retreat rule is not only to impose on the battered woman the responsibility to 
avoid battering (by leaving) before the confrontation, but also to create a new rela-
tion within the world. Time (X) is to count for a pre-retreat rule (Y). Here, the pre-
retreat rule constitutes a relation between men and women in which the battered 
woman is at a distinct disadvantage -for she must retreat where and when others may 
not be required to do so. 
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The embedded social norm (you should leave) once applied to 
Mrs. Watson in a legal context becomes a rule that enforces not only a 
particular relation toward her husband but also enforces a particular 
relation of Watson and other self-defense claimants to the state .57 The 
law of self-defense simply does not, and never has,. required defend-
ants, male or female, to leave before the fight starts.58 
Now, I suspect that the trial judge in Watson did not see himself as 
a bad man or a man who discriminated against women. But that is 
what he did. Perhaps he thought leaving was the proper social norm 
(as many do) or perhaps he truly believed that imminence was the 
proper legal category. 59 But all of this failed to consider that transfer-
ring social relations into legal relations is a creative, dynamic act that 
may destabilize existing assumptions by conflicting with other rules, 
indeed may even reverse assumptions depending upon where, in the 
law (crime or defense, exclusion or inclusion), the norm is incorpo-
rated. Notice that, in Watson, this transformation has reversed nature, 
time and law. What is supposed to be a hard and fast legal category 
based on brute objective fact becomes a contingent social norm. What 
is supposed to be a prediction about the future (is he going to kill 
her?) becomes a statement about the past (she should have left!). 
What is supposed to be a rule of equality and freedom becomes one of 
disadvantage and forced relations. 
To see this, of course, requires a willingness to take time from the 
natural and see it transformed from brute fact to institutional context. 
It also requires one to give up the notion that discrimination is built 
on the categories of man and woman, sameness and difference. The 
notion of an imminent harm does not tell us anything about the iden-
tity of women, it does not stereotype women or, at least on the surface, 
disadvantage women; it does not even seem like a "difference" or a 
"sameness" issue because the rule is not about gender at all (but, in-
stead, time). Neither the rule of imminence, nor the norms it absorbs, 
seem motivated by hostility to women nor are they conventionally un-
derstood as irrational - that she "should have left" is considered the 
proper legal policy by many. The discrimination here is neither mali-
cious nor overt nor even directed necessarily against all women. It is a 
57~ Time, even at common law, served as a proxy for deference to the state- it 
meant no time to go to the king's courts, no time to get help. The trial judge in 
Watson thus adopts a temporal rule in the name of an obligation of deference to the 
State, as the monopolist of force. Mrs. Watson had to leave to defer to the state, to do 
the right thing, to let the police sort it out. Watson, 431 A.2d at 951. 
58. To be sure, a minority of jurisdictions require retreat, but retreat is not pre-
retreat; it requires leaving during the confrontation, not months and years before. 
American law has typically prized freedom of action, limiting the rule of retreat to the 
actual confrontation. See Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note 41, at 1284. 
59. Now, let me hasten to add that this is not "the law" of self-defense; indeed the 
"law" of self-defense - through the introduction of syndrome evidence - tries might-
ily, in psychological guise, to refuse to apply a rule that "she must leave" before the 
fight begins. 
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discrimination of relation, a rule that reenacts a relation of inferiority 
and invisibility. It is a rule that cannot see Mrs. Watson or the hands 
around her neck because all it sees is her-in-relation.60 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, notice how the logic that 
brings us here is precisely the logic of my argument about the Consti-
tution - there I said that if we eliminated the descriptive elements that 
form the positivists' view of constitutional structure, nothing much 
would happen in the real world. The relationships created by the Con-
stitution (voting, appointment, etc.) are far more important than the 
proxy-descriptions on which constitutionalists focus (the words "exec-
utive," "legislative," 'judicial"). So, too, here. The relationships em-
bedded in the idea of time (she-should-have-left) are far more 
important to the law's application than the proxy descriptions of 
states of affairs (imminence as describing time-as-the-clock). After all, 
the clock was simply not the issue (there was no time lag in many of 
these cases). Time as description may be crossed-out from the law of 
self-defense (as some of the most respected of criminal law scholars 
have suggested).61 I suspect that very little would happen either to the 
law or the social relations embedded within the law. The same social 
relations will be replayed and other elements - like necessity - will 
take on the role mediating legal relations that imminence now plays. 
Of course, if one is committed to a view of law as solely positivis-
tic, then one cannot possibly begin to see any of this. If one believes 
that law is to be applied by looking for natural facts in the world, then 
it is impossible to see that law may transform fact into norm - that 
time may become a norm of departure. What I have tried to show 
here is that even the most objective, the most natural, ideas can take 
on meaning within the law. One can only see that this changes the 
relation of woman to man, however, if one acknowledges law's genera-
tivity both within and without the law.62 For the problem, of course, is 
60. It has become popu.lar to talk as if battered women claiming self-defense are 
seeking a special advantage. But if time carries meanings and those meanings impose 
a pre-retreat rule (or even in some cases a retreat rule in a non-retreat jurisdiction), 
then it can hardly be said that women are seeking a special advantage rather than 
relief from a social and legal norm that says they are responsible for their own 
battering. 
61. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHIL. & 
PoL. 105, 127 (Spring 1990) (arguing that "the traditional insistence on a literally 
'imminent' infliction of great bodily harm must be abandoned outright" because the 
correct inquiry is the necessity of the battered woman's action rather than "immi-
nence per se"); see also PAUL H. RoBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES§ 131 (b) (3) at 76-
77 (1984) (stating that "proper application of the necessity requirement would seem 
adequate to prevent potential abuse of a justification defense in cases where the force 
is not imminent."). 
62. As this example makes clear,. the movement from the natural to the institu-
tional is the kind of constitutive act I am trying to elaborate. It differs from the most 
obvious of constitutive acts (creating law from nothing, like creating a chess game, or 
a constitution) but there is a similar structure: one starts with something that appears 
not to be relational or normative (in this case time, a brute natural fact) and then 
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not primarily that one trial judge somewhere does this, or that there is 
a pattern of such reasoning throughout self-defense law (a pattern of 
giving meaning to time), but that the legal relations enforced will be 
ones which people come to see and understand and act upon in the 
world. If people believe that these cases are all about time-as-the-clock, 
then that will be what the cases are about and how they are debated. 
The problem is that this vision happens not only in the law but life, as 
well, with life and law reinforcing each other, cycling in a process that 
keeps the law standing still even as it appears to be moving forward. 
2. Passion 
If the idea of time allows us to see this dynamic "in action," the 
idea of passion reinforces the main themes. Passionate killings are the 
stuff of Grisham, late night TV, and the law. We are all familiar, before 
we enter law school, with the idea that one who kills in passion is less 
culpable than one who kills in "cold" blood. Leaving aside the analytic 
difficulties of that position,63 we accept this principle in real life and 
reconstitute it in our novels, our newspapers, and our understandings 
of daily life. Passion killings are "normally abnormal" killings. We care-
fully, or not so carefully, distinguish between passion killings and 
other more serious acts. Honor killings, for example, are the stuff of 
repressive regimes and veiled women, of patriarchal societies foreign 
to our own; they happen in Jordan and Bangladesh and Pakistan and 
Turkey, 64 not here. In America, one would think, an honor killing 
would be odd, strange, unlikely to be condoned. 
finds this transformed, within the social world, into something with relational mean-
ing. I borrow here some of Searle's vocabulary such as "brute fact." See generally, 
SEARLE, supra note 10. 
63. Conventional theories of punishment do not really explain why provoked 
homicide should in fact be treated less severely. The classic claim is that passionate 
killers are relatively undeterrable (a claim that relies upon a contestable view of deter-
rence); the classic counterclaim is that a rule of punishing provoked homicide would 
in fact deter (the move from a specific utilitarian calculation to a rule utilitarian posi-
tion). See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation De-
fense, 106 YALE LJ. 1331, 1373-74 (1997) [hereinafter Nourse, Passion's Progress]. 
64. It is a stereotyped vision to believe that these honor killings are limited to 
Muslim countries. According to the United Nations, honor crimes are increasing in 
nations as disparate as Brazil, Italy, Uganda and Britain. It is also a stereotyped vision 
to believe that only women suffer; the men, often boys, enlisted to do these crimes 
suffer enormously. Molly Moore, In Turkey, 'Honor Killing' Follows Families to Cities; Wo-
men Are Victims of Village Tradition, WASH. PosT, Aug. 8, 2001, at A1 (discussing pain of 
boy who was forced to kill his sister). Honor killings in other countries are often 
associated with killings by any male family member, even the woman's own family, or 
strangers; this is indeed rare in the United States. Moreover, the term seems to extend 
in the literature along a wide spectrum of conduct. Many honor crimes are similar to 
the standard American crime of a husband killing a wife or girlfriend because of 
infidelity but customs differ widely. For example, there are cases in which "male fam-
ily members gather to vote on the death of women." !d. (Notably, however, the law's 
partial protections are often invoked; after the death vote, the person who is to do the 
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But, of course, American law lives with the vestiges of our own 
peculiarly American version of honor killings and even, to this day, 
has a partial honor defense. The law of the United States, in most 
jurisdictions, permits a lesser penalty for "provoked" killings of wo-
men who have affairs or leave.65 A few years ago, the implications of 
the law erupted into consciousness with a newsworthy case in Mary-
land. 66 When Kenneth Peacock found his wife in bed with another 
man, he got his shotgun and scared his rival off; several hours and a 
gallon of wine later, Peacock shot and killed his wife.67 To the judge 
assigned to this case, there was no question that Peacock suffered an 
adequate provocation resulting in "uncontrollable rage." He sen-
tenced Peacock to eighteen months to be served on work release, and 
within two weeks, Peacock was out ofjail.68 Whether or not this kind 
of a sentence happens often, and it may not, the key here is the 
judge's openly sympathetic reaction, one which verged on suggesting 
that the judge would have done the same himself since the reason for 
this killing, the provocation, was enough to propel any man to "corpo-
ral" punishment.69 
All of this, of course, brings us back to the question of honor 
killings. What is the difference, one must ask, between the woman in 
Egypt or Brazil killed because she was thought to be unfaithful and a 
similar case in the United States? There are, in some cases, significant 
differences in perpetrators and rituals; I am not trying to diminish the 
cultural differences. 70 But the reasons for many of these killings -
both at home and abroad - are strikingly similar. In the United States, 
provocation claims may be grounded on infidelity, fears of infidelity, 
leaving, divorce, or even lesser marital disputes. 71 Of course, Ameri-
killing is picked, "usually someone under the age of 18 who will be treated more 
leniently under the law."). 
65. See Nourse, Passion's Progress, supra note 63, at 1345-47 (detailing cases). 
66. Karl Vick, Md.Judge Taking Heat in Cuckolded Killer Case, WASH. PosT, Oct. 30, 
1994, at Al. 
67. /d. 
68. I d.; see Ann G. Sjoerdsma, Justice: 18 Months for a Wife's Life, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
14, 1994, at 21; see also Lynn Hecht Schafran, There's No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. 
REv. 1063, 1063-64 (1995) (discussing Judge Cahill's sentence in the Peacock case). 
69. According to an article quoting the transcript of proceedings, the trial judge, 
in sentencing Peacock, stated that "the most difficult thing that a judge is called upon 
to do ... is sentencing non-criminals as criminals ... I seriously wonder how many 
married men, married five years or four years would have the strength to walk away, 
but without inflicting some corporal punishment." Schafran, supra note 68, at 1063-
64. 
70. My claim is not that the cultures are the same; it is that "our" American view 
is conditioned on foreignness (unnaturalness, if you will), rather than the similarity of 
the conduct. Customs differ from country to country, culture to culture, even prov-
ince to province. See Honor Killings (Karo Kari) Claims 129 Lives in Sindh During Last Six 
Months, PAKISTAN NEWSWIRE, July 24, 2001; Moore, supra note 64, at Al. 
71. See Nourse, Passion's Progress, supra, note 63, at 1342-66 (showing how the 
American law covers not only imagined or real infidelities, but also simple departures, 
breaches of dating etiquette, and even attempts to leave prompted by violence or 
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can law does not fully condone these killings but neither does the law 
of many foreign jurisdictions condone honor killing. There, as here, 
the law simply offers partial support- passionate killings are generally 
not murders, they are manslaughter; they are not "real" murders, but 
something lesser.72 
Again, we are confronted with what appears a legal irrationality 
which does not appear irrational because it is embedded in the natu-
ral. Standard criminal law scholarship posits passion "naturally" within 
a lost sexual or emotional relationship; as H.L.A. Hart put it, the prov-
ocation defense deals with losses of self-control grounded in human 
"nature."73 Located within a naturalized discourse of mind and psy-
chology, relational patterns become quickly obscured. Traditional 
criminal law scholarship cannot "see" the relations because it focuses 
on a lack of self-control. Law reform has actually exacerbated the law's 
tendency to occlude the relational: the model penal code provisions 
make the defendant's mental state control - if he is extremely emo-
tionally disturbed, the crime is manslaughter not murder. 74 This has 
undermined the classic limits on the passion defense, such as an ac-
divorce). Cf No Honor in Violence Against Women, WASH. TIMES., Aug. 22, 2001, at A14 
(decrying an honor killing in the United States of an Egyptian woman: "[t]his scena-
rio is common in a number of countries where the mere perception of an illicit rela-
tionship .. a decision to divorce an abusive husband .. .is said to bring 'dishonor' to a 
man or family.") ("If a woman leaves home for any reason, it doesn't matter whether 
she actually does anything. Once the men, her father, husband or brother, can't sit 
with their heads held high in the coffee houses, she has to go.");James Dorsey, Men's 
Honour Keeps Murder in the Family, ScoT. ON SuNDAY, Aug. 12, 2001, at 19; This Mother 
Has Vanished, LoNDON OBSERVER, July 22, 2001 (defining an honor killing involving 
the "shame" brought on by "having an affair or ... simply wishing to divorce her 
husband"). 
72. See Moore, supra note 64 ("In Turkey, the killing of a family member draws 
the most stern penalty allowable: death or life in prison. But if a judge rules there was 
provocation for the killing - such as a question of honor - the penalty can be re-
duced." So, in the end, "perpetrators of [honor] crimes are legally permitted shorter 
prison terms than those who commit similar crimes for other reasons."). The Turkish 
'honor crime' statute, last amended in 1953, mitigates both murder and battery 
charges: "As regards perpetrators who commit [homicide or battery], against wife, 
husband, sister or offspring, at the time the victim is caught while in the act of adul-
tery or illegal sexual intercourse, or while the victim was about to commit adultery or 
about to engage in illegal sexual intercourse, or while the victim was in a situation 
showing, free from any doubt, that he or she has just completed the act of adultery or 
illegal sexual intercourse; or against another person caught participating in such acts 
with one of the aforesaid relatives, or against both, the punishment prescribed for the 
offense shall be commuted to imprisonment. In lieu of heavy life imprisonment, im-
prisonment for four to eight years, and in lieu of death, imprisonment for five to ten 
years shall be imposed." THE TuRKISH CRIMINAL CoDE, § 462 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 
1964). 
73. H. L.A. HART, PuNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY: EssAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY oF 
LAw 33 (1968) (relying on "common sense generalizations" about "human nature" 
for conclusion that men are "capable of self-control when confronted with an open 
till but not when confronted with a wife in adultery."). 
74. See MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 210.3. 
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tual as opposed to an imagined affair, a real relationship as opposed 
to an imagined one, a continued relationship as opposed to one en-
ded in divorce.75 Of course, even under the model penal code, the 
emotional disturbance must be reasonable, but from where does a 
reasonable passion come? It comes from the same transaction we have 
seen above - social norm translated into passion. It comes from the 
parties' relations. 
Imagine one co-worker who kills another or a neighbor who kills 
another. Do these killings suggest "natural" passion? Unlikely. We do 
not say that the co-worker or the neighbor is likely to have acted in 
"reasonable" passion based simply on the relation of neighboring 
houses or a joint employer. 76 What then generates "reasonable" pas-
sion in the cases I have described? It is the parties' intimate relation. 
The idea of passion, like time, appears to measure brute fact - in this 
case, quickened pulses and heartbeats and disturbed minds. But pas-
sion, like time, is a reflection of our social relations. And these norms 
of relation are more powerful than the law's descriptions of mind. 
Strike the word passion from the passion defense and little, I suspect 
would change. This is precisely what the model penal code attempted 
to do, and did, by transferring all the normative rules about the de-
fense into a question of "extreme emotional disturbance."77 The nor-
mative questions raised by the defense haven't gone away; they have 
simply gone underground. 
If relations are ·essential to understanding the idea of passion, 
then it is also important to see how the transformation from social to 
legal norm, froin purported fact to institutional relation, generates 
new relations. Like time, passion becomes generative. Consider the 
case of the woman who leaves and gets a divorce - does as the law 
suggests in other circumstances - and finds that her ex-husband fol-
lows her, sees her dating, and kills. She has cut off the relation, but it 
continues to follow her. The law before tnis transaction assumed male 
and female equality, it assumed her liberty to choose partners. But, in 
the guise of passion, we see this norm silently challenged. She has cut 
off the relation, but the law of passion may demand that the relation 
follow her. To maintain a legal defense of reasonable passion in these 
circumstances, the criminal law supports, even if only in a partial way, 
the killer's sense of entitlement to maintain a connection she has sev-
ered. What has passion become but an odd yet resilient version of an 
older regime of marital unity? What was once a relation of equality 
becomes one of inequality and oppression. 78 
75. See Nourse, Passion's Progress, supra note 63, at 1342-66. 
76. In some jurisdictions, defendants in such positions can and do raise provoca-
tion defenses but they rarely succeed. 
77. MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 210.3. 
78. The relational view also shows how apparent progress in the law may yield 
real regression. The reformed provocation law of the Model Penal Code looked for-
ward to a world of psychological reality - of minds that had lost self-control. But, in 
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The point that women have been defined, much to their detri-
ment, in their "relation" to others is not a new one. But what I would 
like to emphasize here is a reason why the law cannot "see" or "know" 
this as discrimination. It is not only that the relational issues cannot 
be seen because, once pointed out, these cases do often appall even 
those who see them as nondiscriminatory. The essential intellectual 
problem is this: the inequalities cannot be seen because of the idea of 
law upon which they depend. The inequalities cannot be seen be-
cause they are seen as outside the law - in the realm of the private and 
non-justiciable (these are cases of sex and privacy and love triangles). 
The inequalities cannot be seen because people think that the passion 
defense applies equally- to both men and women; she, too, can argue 
that when he leaves, she killed in a passion. The only problem is that 
this formal equality fails to reveal the relational inequality at stake. 
The problem is not that the passion defense is either motivated by 
animus toward women or instantiates formal inequality or creates dis-
parate treatment. The problem is that the passion defense creates a 
set of relations that are intolerably inconsistent with basic norms of 
liberty for women. The discrimination here is not against sex, but dis-
crimination embedded in forced relations, coerced fidelity, punish-
ment for sex and leaving and divorce, and male demands of relational 
unity. We have no problem seeing that in some cases - in cases of 
honor killings. But that is because the image of these killings, trans-
posed to a foreign place, is deprived of its naturalness; it is deprived of 
the sense that a killing in the heat of passion is a normally abnormal 
event. 
3. Blood 
The relational critique does not require a topic within feminism 
or a relation between men and women. One can see how this kind of 
argument works in other naturalized places, in public as well as appar-
ently private disputes. This is where feminism may well move beyond 
itself. Here, I turn to a question of standard constitutional law and the 
idea of blood. 
Once upon a time in the United States, we decided to eradicate 
crime by cleansing American blood of its criminalistic tendencies. In 
the first decades of the last century, laws prescribing the sterilization 
of habitual criminals were on the books throughout the country. 
Thousands of men, and more women, were sterilized under analo-
gous laws applied to the so-called "feeble-minded" (then a technical 
term denoting certain kinds of insanity which we would today call im-
morality). In the late twenties, the Supreme Court upheld these laws, 
this move "forward," it reenacted the past by failing to address the relational ideas 
implicit in the original defense. Status and relation appeared to be rejected but, in-
stead, lived on within naturalized ideas of passion and mind. What is reformed ap-
pears on the surface, what is ancient is the law's real world relational residue, which is 
sustained even as it is apparently transformed. See generally Siegel, supra note 20. 
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noting infamously that "three generations of imbeciles" were 
enough. 79 But in a decision now known for other reasons, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, the Supreme Court reversed itself, concluding that the ster-
ilization of habitual criminals was a violation of the equal protection 
clause.80 So ended the first reign, at least, of blood in American crimi-
nallaw.81 
Today, Skinners result is barely questioned but its reasoning re-
mains deeply controversial. No one, I think, believes Skinner should be 
reversed and, yet, many question whether it is a deeply dangerous de-
cision. Indeed, the case has been constructed as something of a refer-
endum on constitutional positivism - the importance of the very 
writtenness of the constitution. The standard understanding of Skinner 
is that it helps to create a right of procreation and deems it "funda-
mental." This prompts strict constructionists to ask: from where does 
this right hail in the constitution and why is it fundamental?82 This is, 
of course, a loaded question, a question loaded with the present- it is 
the abortion decisions, not Skinner, that presumably are the ques-
tioner's concern. But it is not simply textualism that is at issue - it is 
also Skinners reliance on the equal protection clause. Even those who 
praise Skinner for its influence on later law, those who find no prob-
lem with its purported embrace of fundamental rights, question its 
equality rationale. How could Justice Douglas have possibly relied on 
the equal protection clause, they ask, if that clause simply requires 
equality in the positive law? If that were true, then a law that sterilized 
"equally" should be constitutional.83 
My own view is that these deeply positivist questions are largely 
irrelevant to an understanding of Skinner.84 The question raised by 
Skinner is far more important than a question about courts and writ-
tenness - it is about the very nature of our political order. Indeed, 
79. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
80. 316 u.s. 535, 538 (1942). 
81. This issue has not disappeared: as late as the 1960's, state legislatures, partic-
ularly in the south, endeavored to pass laws reflecting a policy aimed to sterilize poor, 
Mrican American women. These laws were overwhelmingly written to affect welfare 
mothers' fertility. During the same period, Puerto Rican and Native-American women 
were systematically sterilized. DoROTHY RoBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RAcE, RE-
PRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 89-98 (1999). 
82. See RoBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAw 63-64 (1990) ("Skinner revived and remade the equal protection clause" in 
ways that "cannot avoid legislating" by permitting courts to decide which classifications 
should be treated like race.). 
83. Justice Stone raised this concern in his concurring opinion. Skinner, 316 U.S. 
at 543 ("If Oklahoma may resort generally to the sterilization of criminals ... I seri-
ously doubt that the equal protection clause requires it to apply the measure to all 
criminals in the first instance, or to none.") (Stone, J., concurring). 
84. The contemporary view of Skinner, like so much else in constitutional law 
today, reflects a kind of judicial narcissism- a tendency among judges and law profes-
sors to see the constitution as constitutional law and law alone and thus to place law 
and courts at the center of the constitutional universe. 
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Skinner is not about the absence of text or even the creation of funda-
mental rights; it is about blood and racism and, more fundamentally, 
about blood as political theory. But, to see that, one must know much 
more about the history of the case. One must situate blood, not in 
patterns of cases, but patterns of history, to understand how it imbibes 
relations of racism and inferiority. Indeed, one can see quite clearly 
how Skinner, in the end, had to be decided the way it was - why it is an 
equal protection case - and why there is relational reason in its appar-
ent doctrinal irrationalities. 85 
To the state of Oklahoma, Jack T. Skinner was a petty chicken 
thief and robber, a man likely to become a public charge, and there-
fore a man who should not be able to pass his "criminalistic" genes to 
his children. In Skinners day, this argument was hardly novel; the idea 
that crime was inherited was supported by more than half a century of 
scholarly work and broad public opinion. By the mid-1930s, steriliza-
tion laws were on the books in at least half of the states; thousands of 
Americans had been sterilized under these policies; and, according to 
the Gallup organization, the vast majority of Americans approved.86 
Today, we call the idea "eugenics," and hold our breath. Then, 
eugenics was thought to be a science grounded in sound genetics and 
promising reform. Some of the most famous men and women in the 
United States were strong advocates of eugenic science - David Starr 
Jordan (the progressive president of Stanford University), Teddy 
Roosevelt (former outspoken President), and Margaret Sanger (birth 
control advocate) among them.87 If eugenics was still reputable sci-
ence in the early 1930s, it was more than a science, it aspired to be-
85. Some part of this argument appears in Nourse, Constitutional, supra note 12, 
at 1437-42; much of it is in my ongoing book project, SKINNER's TRIAL. 
86. See DANIEL]. KEvLES, IN THE NAME OF EuGENics: GENETICS AND THE UsEs OF 
HuMAN HEREDITI' 112 (1995) (stating that "[b]y the mid-thirties, some twenty thou-
sand sterilizations had been legally performed in the United States."); id. at Ill (stat-
ing that "[b]y the end of the nineteen-twenties, sterilization laws were on the books of 
twenty-four states"); see also Oklahoma Puts Sterilization Law Into l!,Yfect, LITERARY DIGEST, 
vol. 117, no. 19, at 17 (May 12, 1934) (reporting that "[s]terilization, as a means to 
eliminate criminality and imbecility, is now legal in twenty-seven states" and that 
"[r]ecent reports show that thousands of people have undergone the operation by 
legal order. In California, alone, 10,000 men and women have been sterilized."). On 
the approval of Americans, see American Institute of Public Opinion, GALLUP PoLL 
REPORTS 1935-1968 at 78 (The Gallup Poll1969) (reporting that "84% of nation favor 
sterilization of habitual criminals and hopelessly insane.") (May 23, 1937). 
87. "Aided and abetted by the Depression, sterilization drew diverse support in 
the United States and Britain which went far beyond eugenicists. Its advocates ranged 
from college professors to elementary school principals, from clubwomen to mental-
health workers, from the British Conservative Women's Reform Association to the 
New Jersey League of Women Voters, from private congresses to the 1930 White 
House Conference on Children and Health, ... from Lord Horder, physician of King 
George Vl and the Prince of Wales, to H.L. Mencken, who suggested that the federal 
government pay a thousand dollars to every "adult American" who volunteered to be 
sterilized." KEVLES, supra note 86, at 115. On Teddy Roosevelt and Margaret Sanger, 
see id. at 94; on David Starr Jordan, see id. at 64. 
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come a political and emotional faith. 88 Since at least Teddy Roosevelt, 
the public had been listening to claims that attributed America's suc-
cess to its "Anglo-Saxon blood."89 Persistent efforts had been made, 
during the first two decades of the century, to keep that blood pure by 
closing America's doors to what were perceived to be lesser and dan-
gerous immigrants.90 The dilution of American blood was not only a 
concern of individuals; the blood of the nation appeared to be at 
stake as well. 
If the eugenic movement thrived on this common sense of blood, 
it also nurtured a particularly malevolent notion of blood and na-
tional health. If there was "good bl()od" to be nurtured, there was 
"bad blood" to be isolated, segregated or sterilized. There was, to use 
the term of the day, "the menace of the unfit." For at least fifty years 
before Skinner's case was tried, a diverse group of eugenicists, crimi-
nologists, sociologists, and biologists (and even welfare reformers) 
had inveighed against the "unfit," a group variously defined to include 
the feebleminded, the poor, the criminalistic, the epileptic, the deaf 
and even the poor. Study after study produced by social scientists and 
geneticists during this period appeared to support the notion that the 
unfit were propagating at an unusually high rate relative to the rest of 
the population; and thus diluting good blood with bad.91 As Lothrop 
Stoddard, a popularizer of eugenics, put it in the twenties, the unfit 
are "cancerous growths . . infecting the blood of whole 
communities .... "92 
What you ask does this have to do with Skinnm With the "rela-
tional critique?" Well, everything. Today, lawyers have formed Skin-
ners popular history in the image of a piece of text that never even 
appears in the decision - "fundamental rights" or a "fundamental 
88. In Oklahoma, as elsewhere, the sterilization laws were the product of a vari-
ety of political interests, including new dealers, reformers, and those who saw them-
selves on a crusade to rid the next generation of disease. Some hoped that science 
might remake society in its image and that tainted blood, like disease, might be eradi-
cated in men's lifetime. For the latter point, see VICTORIA NoURSE, SKINNER's TRIAL 
(forthcoming). 
89. DIANE B. PAuL, CoNTROLLING HuMAN HEREDIIY, 1865 TO THE PRESENT 102 
(1995). 
90. The influence of eugenics on the immigration debates of the 1920s is re-
flected in the passage of the National Origins Act of 1924, which limited the number 
of immigrants allowed citizenship in the United States according to their race. The 
prominent eugenicist Charles Davenport encouraged citizens to see the danger of 
increasing the numbers of non-Nordic immigrants to the United States. KEVLES, supra 
note 86, at 46-51. Congressman Albert johnson, who chaired the Committee on Im-
migration and Naturalization, appointed Harry Laughlin, Charles Davenport's pro-
tege, as Expert Eugenics Agent to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. 
PAuL, supra note 89, at 105. 
91. See generally MARK HALLER, EuGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN 
THOUGHT (1963); KEVLES, supra note 86, at ch. 5. 
92. LOTHROP STODDARD, THE REVOLT AGAINST CIVlLIZATION: THE MENACE OF THE 
UNOERMAN 94 (1922). 
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right to procreate."93 Then, the driving force behind Douglas's opin-
ion was precisely what he refused to say openly: the risks of eugenics. 
Blood, the basis of the Oklahoma statute, purported to be natural; it 
appeared to carry the authority of science. But, in fact, it reflected a 
contingent and and controversial social relation - eugenics was a sci-
ence of bad blood, where bad blood meant social inferiority. By 1942, 
this had become quite clear. At the time Douglas wrote the opinion, 
everyone knew that the sterilization movement, of which Oklahoma's 
statute was a small part, was based on the idea that society could 
cleanse itself of the "unfit." Scientists who, in the early thirties, had 
supported the program had by then repudiated eugenics. More im-
portantly, life had made clear the political dangers of these policies in 
the wrong hands: Hitler's sterilization program, widely publicized in 
America as early as late 1933, had been transformed into something 
far more disturbing.94 
Today, this knowledge goes some way toward making sense of the 
apparent irrationalities of Justice Douglas's rather tortured opinion. 
Indeed, one can reconceive of the opinion as an experiment in the 
relational. Today, the opinion seems virtually incomprehensible for 
those looking for its famous phrases - most of the opinion is devoted 
to arcane distinctions in the criminal law. Why did Douglas labor so 
hard over the criminal law? He wanted to make the criminal statute 
say what its relations were. He wanted it to wear its relations of inferi-
ority on its surface. Justice Douglas found what he was looking for: a 
clause that exempted embezzlers from sterilization. He spent page af-
ter page coming to the conclusion that the statute discriminated be-
tween embezzlers and chicken thieves.95 It was as if he had written: "if 
we changed the relation of the defendant to the state - if we assumed 
he was a high class character, an embezzler, a white collar criminal-
would the state be sterilizing the poor man?" 
All of this might have been made a good deal more clear and 
withstood future scrutiny better had Justice Douglas stated what he 
knew about the case, instead of simply adverting to it obliquely. He 
93. Contrary to popular understanding, the opinion never uses these terms. It 
says that procreation is fundamental to the "race." It does refer to human rights in the 
opening of the opinion and it does claim that the legislation "involves one of the basic 
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence 
and survival of the race." Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. As to marriage, as a legal form, this 
is surely an overstatement; as to procreation, it is a truism. 
94. Publicity concerning the German sterilization movement first hit the presses 
in late 1933, as Hitler's planned "eugenic" courts were to go into operation in January 
of the next year. See julia McCarthy, Sterilization-How It Works, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 
22, 1933 at 1. On events in Germany, see LuCY S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE 
jEws 1999-1945, 136-39 (Bantam Trade ed. 1986). Of course, there was nothing inher-
ent in the sterilization movement itself that demanded a move from sterilization to 
the final solution; in Denmark and Finland and elsewhere, sterilization continued 
unabated, for some time, after WWII. 
95. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 ("Embezzlers are forever free. Those who steal or 
take in other ways are not."). !d. at 542. 
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acknowledged that the "embezzler exception" was but one of the ine-
qualities of the statute.96 And, indeed, there were other reasons that 
betrayed the statute as riddled with the potential for racism and caste. 
The statute sterilized those who had committed "crimes of moral tur-
pitude." In the real world, that meant "white trash and blacks and 
other undesirables" (i.e. "the unfit").97 No one who had been on the 
Supreme Court in the 1930s could have failed to mistake the term as 
code for race, for it played just that role, and was so quoted by the 
court in one of the most public and controversial criminal law cases of 
the twentieth century - the Scottsboro trials. In Norris v. Alabama, the 
Court noted that this was the way that southerners were keeping 
blacks out of jury boxes (and voting booths). The Court's opinion 
specifically reported that the jury commissioner, in that case, had testi-
fied: "I never met a 'negro' who had not committed a 'crime of moral 
turpitude.' "98 
But the relation between blood and race would have been clearer 
still if Justice Douglas had simply published his draft of the opinion, a 
draft that openly likened the Oklahoma statute with Hitler's program 
to eradicate all but the Nordic races.99 Perhaps Douglas thought 
these points too obvious, too pointed or painful, to bear repeating. 
Perhaps he believed that everyone knew that the case wasn't simply 
about science or blood or crime. In April of 1942, whenJustice Doug-
las drafted the opinion, the world was at war to save itself from a dicta-
tor who had plunged them into world conflict precisely because he 
sought a perverse racial purity. Hitler's racism had been known as 
early as 1933 when he touted one of his first new initiatives as Chan-
cellor, the Nazi sterilization law. By the summer of 1942, when the 
Supreme Court issued the Skinner opinion, the public was at war to 
stem the tide of Naziism. 100 No one at the time could have read the 
96. "We do not stop to point out all of the inequalities in this Act." !d. at 538. 
97. Skinner was reported by newspapers to be a "cripple." He was not African-
American, to the extent that this can be understood from "silence" on his race. 
98. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598-99 (1935). Decades later, the Supreme 
Court came to the same conclusion in Hunterv. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), hold-
ing that Alabama had cloaked blatant efforts to establish "white supremacy" by disen-
franchising blacks through a state constitutional provision that barred voting by 
persons who had committed a "crime involving moral turpitude." !d. at 228-32. 
99. For example, Justice Douglas originally wrote as follows: "The classification 
hardly has firmer constitutional basis than if in dealing with particular offenses it drew 
a line between rich and poor or between Nordic and other racial types." See William 
0. Douglas, Draft of Opinion in Skinner (unpublished draft, on file with Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress). 
100. The depth of Douglas's knowledge on the Jewish question is unclear but it 
is quite clear that he knew the situation was serious. After the Skinner opinion was 
issued, Douglas wrote a draft of a speech in which he called attention to the decade-
long "systematic torture" of the Jews by Hitler. William 0. Douglas, Radio Address 
from Madison Square Garden (Mar. 1, 1943) (draft on file with Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress). When Douglas ultimately gave the speech, one of his first tele-
grams of congratulation was from the NAACP. Letter from Walter White, Secretary, 
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opinion's reference to "evil and reckless hands"101 as a reference to 
anyone but Hitler. 
As we have seen before, the relations here - the social relations of 
inferiority - were more powerful than the legal descriptions. This is 
why, in the end, the statute should (and would have been) struck 
down with or without the "embezzler" exception or the criminal law 
distinctions on which Justice Douglas relied. Today, readers consider 
Skinner a case of fundamental rights because they are uncomfortable 
with a rationale that seems to make the case come out the other way if 
the statute had simply "sterilized all criminals equally." But even if the 
"embezzler" exception were not in the statute, and even if the statu-
tory term "crime of moral turpitude" were not code for race and caste, 
the result would have been the same. Even without these terms, sterili-
zation meant the eradication of the unfit and that meant a relation of 
state-sponsored genetic inferiority. 
What makes Skinner so remarkable, to me, is how clearly the opin-
ion seems to recognize the power of law to reconstitute social rela-
tions. What would happen, how would relations be different, Justice 
Douglas asked, if we allowed states to have such laws, if this power of 
genetic determination were lodged in the hands of politics? Douglas, 
in the end, made it quite clear: "The power to sterilize, if exercised, 
may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reck-
less hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the domi-
nant group to wither and disappear." Douglas knew that sterilization, 
however benignly administered, created grave political risks - that it 
could be used by those in power to eradicate their enemies and thus 
perpetuate themselves (in life and in power). This is precisely the 
reason we may strike the key descriptive term here - fundamentality-
and the case is quite likely to have come out the same way. 102 Funda-
mentality is but a description of a relation of inviolability, a conclu-
sion, not an argument. Skinner does not create new constitutional text; 
it relies upon the equal protection clause in its most basic meaning. In 
a democracy, there can be no basis for a self-perpetuating aristocracy, 
genetic or otherwise. 1o3 
Skinner, and the sterilization of criminals, stood at the crossroads 
of two worlds that once met in war: a world that grounded its govern-
ments in the idea that some were naturally superior and a world in 
which that belief had become something to be feared and detested. 
NAACP, to William 0. Douglas (Mar. 5, 1943) (on file with Manuscript Division, Li-
brary of Congress). Justice Douglas had apparently departed from his prepared text 
to talk specifically about America's own racial shame. 
101. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
102. It is worth noting, as well, that Douglas's reference to strict scrutiny seems 
ambiguous at best. Throughout the opinion, he insists that he is deferring to the 
state, that the court is not substituting its own judgment - declarations manifestly 
inconsistent with heightened scrutiny. 
103. Lest this be misinterpreted, I make no claim here about the nature orexis-
tence of other fundamental rights. 
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Ask a lawyer about Skinner today and, if schooled, he will tell you none 
of this (he will use the jargon of scrutinies and rights and funda-
mentality).104 Skinners quotable phrases are far less important, in my 
view, than the links between blood and racism and constitution that 
history exposes. In Skinner, the court recognized the ways in which a 
rule of natural superiority, once transformed from social norm to le-
gal rule, not only changes the relations of persons to each other, but 
can change our very form of government. Eugenics was more than a 
science; it implied a political theory of how it is that some come to 
exercise legitimate power over others. The constitutional life of the 
case thus makes quite clear what the constitutional law may not: there 
is no specific text in our constitution today that says "our government 
shall not be one of aristocracy," where some rule over others because 
they are "naturally" better. And, yet, if there is one thing that we can 
be certain about, it is that our constitution's spirit and founding con-
demns aristocracy, biological or otherwise. 
III. THEORY AND QuESTIONS 
Examples will only get one so far. The ultimate question I want to 
ask (a question that I don't even attempt to answer here) is whether it 
is possible to consider law-application based on relation rather than 
on interest or text or even policy. What would such legal reasoning 
look like? Would it be more just? Or simply different? Would it be 
more friendly to women? Or simply more illuminating of gender di-
lemmas? Would it place equality at the center of the law? Or would it 
risk dissolving individual into community? These are some of the 
questions raised by my examples; they are large ones, to which I have 
no immediate answers. Let me simply try to conclude by putting the 
"relational critique" in some context and suggesting a few further 
implications. 
Nature; relation; constitution; life. The intellectual progression that I 
have sketched above begins with nature. Most lawyers, let us face it, do 
not study concepts/ideas such as time or passion or blood. To most 
lawyers, these do not seem like law at all. If my examples are worth 
anything, at a minimum, they should suggest that scholarship, femi-
nist and otherwise, might do well to focus more closely on questions 
of the "natural." Feminists, I think, know just how important the idea 
of the "natural" may be. The idea of the female body has held an 
extraordinary power over our fates for decades and indeed centuries. 
Given our history, it should not be surprising to learn that law's "na-
ture" - whether it be in the form of time or passion, force or hostility 
-has been invested with ideas about woman's relation to man. If law 
104. jOHN E. NowAK & RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw§ 14.27, at 
797 (5th ed. 1995) (describing the holding in Skinner as follows: "this classification 
violated the equal protection clause because it could not withstand the scrutiny to 
which the fundamental nature of the right involved demanded it be subjected."). 
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is to free itself of anti-feminism, law's relations must be revealed, dis-
aggregated, and disembodied. And, in so doing, it must be made 
clear that anti-feminism may be embedded in places that do not even 
seem like they are about women or about gender or even about law 
(such as time, passion and blood). 
From the natural to the relational. I have argued that various natural 
concepts may serve as proxies for relations. This idea is a feminist idea 
to the extent that it helps us see the ways in which the law naturalizes 
that which should be seen as unnatural, discriminatory, and even per-
verse. Indeed, I think that there is a vast array of feminist scholarship 
that effectively unpacks that which is "natural" in relations. In some 
cases, this is obvious: Martha Fineman's re-imagination of the family 
as a mother/child dyad rather than a sexual relation;105 Jane Larson 
and Linda Hirshman's construction of sexuality in terms of a bargain-
ing relationship;106 Mary Becker's unpacking of the naturalness of 
heterosexuality as facilitating a relation of dominance by men of wo-
men.107 One need not focus on sex, however. This happens elsewhere, 
in discrimination law and labor relations, in questions about race and 
disability and even jurisdiction. Vicki Shultz transformed a woman's 
choice of jobs from a natural to a constructed relation;108 Kimberle 
Crenshaw and Patricia Williams have reconstructed relations of race 
as sex and sex as race;109 Joan Williams has re-imagined the natural in 
work as an image of an ideal worker's relation to the workplace;110 
and Judith Resnik has shown that even legal questions such as 'juris-
diction" although appearing "naturally" as genderless may in fact re-
flect gender relations. 111 Perhaps then, what I have said is so obvious 
that it need not have been said; perhaps I am naive to think that there 
is value in bringing these otherwise disparate views together. Or per-
haps this is a small place, and it is small, where sameness and differ-
ence, caring and domination, may meet. 11 2 
105. FINEMAN, supra note l. 
106. jANE E. LARsoN & LINDA R. HIRSHMAN, HARD BARGAINS: THE PoLITics oF SEx 
(1998). 
107. Becker, supra note 8. 
108. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: judicial Interpretations Of 
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 
HARv. L. REv. 1749, 1816 (1990). 
109. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE 
ALCHEMY OF RAcE AND RIGHTS (1991). 
llO. joAN WILLIAMs, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WoRK CoNFLICT AND 
WHAT TO Do ABouT IT (2000). 
111. Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal 
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682 (1991). 
112. There will be those who will say, I suspect, that I have diminished feminism 
by this, that feminism to be effective must stand alone, it must be radical, and other. If 
this is true, it pretty much eliminates the possibility of political action. My aim is not 
so much to eliminate questions of sex and power as to supplement them, to disaggre-
gate them into the relations that they both represent. 
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At the same time, I do not want to diminish the degree to which 
the idea of the relational is not owned by feminism but is grounded in 
a variety of other traditions. My own ideas of the relational come from 
a place where the bottom-up (my research on crime and constitution) 
meets top-down, the theory and practice of realism. The notion that 
the natural yields and constitutes important social relations is a much 
broader phenomenon than simply the natural as it relates to women. 
To borrow an example from John Searle,113 consider the pieces of 
paper that we use as money. Yes, money is made of paper, paper no 
different in brute reality from the piece of paper on which I now 
write. In real life, however, important distinctions and actions are 
made based on how we think about the pieces of paper we call money. 
There is money that is a gift, money that is extortion, money that pays 
a tax bill. One reason we make such distinctions, I believe (and here I 
amend Searle with Dewey, grounding all of this in lived experience), 
is that in each of these cases money acts - it creates different lived 
relations. In each case, we can disaggregate the natural and find that 
different relations are created, relations of citizenship and obligation 
(tax), relations of love and respect (gift), relations of hostility and vio-
lence (extortion). At least as far as life is concerned, the relations are 
far more important than the piece of paper (money), but the piece of 
paper enacts the relation, it helps to constitute it, in ways that create a 
fabulously complex and rich economic order.114 
From nature to relation to constitution. The relational critique is not 
complete without thinking about the ways in which law is generative. 
The question here is not simply a matter of disaggregating the natural 
but seeing how law re-aggregates it within a new institutional context. 
Once we see the natural as relation, the question becomes how the 
law absorbs these relations. Here, my argument has been that law 
transforms the relations- it regenerates them in its own image. A so-
cial norm ("you should leave") means one thing when uttered over 
the backyard fence, quite another when it becomes a silent rule of 
self-defense. What was gossip becomes force, what was softly condem-
natory becomes hard-edged. What was a question about life be_comes a 
question about law's institutions. We can see this in the way that immi-
113. SEARLE, supra note 10. 
114. Some, of course, will object to this as too simple. They will remind us that 
there is no logical difference really between the description of a thing and a relation. 
Yes, it is true that relations may be reified, hypostatized. But my point here is not a 
logical one; it is a question of describing our experience as our experience. It is a 
question of attempting, at least temporarily, to unify the subjective and objective, 
through the action of thinking. DEWEY, supra note 28, at 19 (arguing that inquiry must 
be constantly reminded to repair to real experience so as to replace reified "reflective 
products"); see also id. at 11 (noting that the purpose of empirical method is to "note 
how and why the whole is distinguished into subject and object, nature and mental 
operations."); id. at 5 ("the very meaning and purport of empirical method is that 
things are to be studied on their own account, so as to find out what is revealed when 
they are experienced."). 
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nence takes on the meaning of necessity in the criminal law; 115 we can 
see this in the way that blood takes on the very meaning of a written 
constitution. 116 If we are to cut through this self-reflexive habit, this 
endless repetition of the same questions that positivism invites us to 
ask (questions about courts themselves), then it seems important to 
resist the natural with the constitutive. 
Law-as-Relation. There is a conventional view of law that begins 
from the geography of the individual and the command of the sover-
eign. Law's job is to both command and protect; it commands by posi-
tive law and it protects by arming the individual with a protected 
forum or space, an island of personal sovereignty from which he may, 
if he chooses, hurl insults against an oppressive state. The constitu-
tional law of the twentieth century began and ended with such a no-
tion. At the beginning, it was the zone of an individual's liberty that 
was thought to make labor unions so strange and terrible and corpo-
rate regulation dangerous. At the end of the century, it was the indi-
vidual's rights over their body and their mind that were thought to 
form the most fundamental zone of privacy. The political views have 
changed, but the basic conceptual commitments have not. The right 
and left simply view the potential for state oppression differently -
property, not civil rights, economic freedom, not social equality. The 
general middle-of-the-road discourse about law today - and that is 
what influences lawyers and judges - is still a discourse in which law is 
seen as command of the state to the individual who must protect him-
self against the state by carving out a protected sphere. 
I have no quarrel with the idea that we must protect individuals 
from a potentially oppressive state. But I have doubts about whether 
this is a complete image of law or one that feminism can accept. Our 
existence as individuals depends upon our relations to each other. 
Whether we view ourselves as victims or heros of those relations, they 
are r~lations nonetheless. Whether they are relations between individ-
uals or relations between the individual and the state, they are still 
relations. And those relations are what give meaning and life to law; 
quite literally, it is these relations that constitute the law. They are the 
lens through which we make sense of "reasonable" actions and emo-
tions and judgments, of passion and time and causation and force and 
sex. 
Traditional positivism takes for its principal question the idea of 
law's authority, its pedigree; it looks for law's author (whether that be 
115. What I mean by this is that the imminence (time) question turns out to be a 
proxy for the most important and apparently unresolved question in self-defense -
the question of necessity. Nourse, Subjectivity, supra note 41, at 1266-76 (discussing the 
meaning of necessity as the fundamental question that has never been resolved in self-
defense cases and which haunts the debate about battered woman cases). 
116. Blood, which was at stake in Skinner, has been transformed in law into a 
question about whether there are fundamental rights, a question that becomes, for 
many, a question of writtenness of the constitution. 
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the ancient sovereign who commanded or the democratic legislature 
that now provides a pedigree). Feminism must imagine that there is a 
world in which we are all law's author, in theory if not in practice. Law 
is not only a top-down affair. It comes from the bottom-up, from social 
meanings and relations, cycling through legislative language, only to 
then return back to the world. The willed or author theory of law is 
and must be foreign to feminism, if for no other reason than that it is 
based on hierarchy and force.n 7 The important question cannot be 
one of authorship but of the relations that law creates and how these 
relational structures "canalize action."118 Law does not only bind with 
force (there is not enough force to bind us all); the law binds, in part, 
by allowing creative power, by providing the hope and opportunity of 
giving birth to new relations and new ideas. 119 Public opinion, knowl-
edge, and the relations it creates are extraordinarily powerful (just 
look at the flags outside your window, as you read this). It is public 
opinion that constitutes the state, which poses all sorts of problems in 
a far-flung democracy such as ours, but problems that are at the very 
least embodied and real, rather than transcendental and textual. No 
text ever stopped a tank or a lynch mob, but the beliefs and actions of 
many in just relations to each other have. Power, in real life, is not 
simply violence. There is power to persuade, to love, to generate, to 
govern oneself in relation to others. 
Feminism knows this because it knows the law's creative and de-
structive powers. It knows the law's ability to transform nature into 
bondage but, also, to release some of bondage's most obvious badges. 
I tell my students that the Constitution has made me possible even 
though it never imagined I could exist; it could only do that, if there 
was the possibility, so faint it seems at times, of regeneration, of birth. 
Our constitution must hold out the possibility of change if it is to be a 
r r 
117. As Dewey put it (when he rejected the command theory of law): "The 'com-
mand' theory of common and statute law is in reality a dialectical consequence of the 
theories ... which define the state in terms of an antecedent causation, specifically of 
that theory which takes 'will' to be the causal force which generates the state. If a will 
is the origin of the state, then state-action expresses itself in injunctions and prohibi-
tions imposed by its will upon the wills of subjects ... The logical conclusion is that the 
ground of obedience lies ultimately in superior force .... In fact the idea of authority 
is abolished and that of force substituted." jOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITs PROBLEMS 
53 ( 1927). Dewey goes on to argue that this does not change when one substitutes an 
overruling "general will." !d. at 54. 
118. Dewey argued against the author theory of law because he believed that the 
important problem in a democracy was how the public would organize and recognize 
itself as a public. 
119. This seems to me to be essential to democracy. It is only because we acqui-
esce when we lose in politics (as opposed to engaging in armed revolt) that we have a 
government at all. Acquiescence requires the anticipation that "one day" things will 
change, that one will be in the majority, that one will act as sovereign. This hope, 
then, in law's creativity, seems written into the public psychology, if nothing else, of 
democracy. Stephen Holmes, Tocqueuille and Democracy, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 
(David Copp eta!. eds. 1993). 
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constitution at all (where constitution means constitution of a politi-
cal order). So, while there is very much to do, and the majority of 
examples I have given are of ways in which the law occludes and still 
enforces ancient ideas of women's inferiority, I continue to hold out 
the possibility of hope that we might see passion and time fall the way 
of blood (as it did in Skinner), that somewhere someday, relational 
understandings might illuminate rather than occlude. 
There is always the danger, of course, that this is but a phantom, 
created within a world of patriarchy to support that world. Perhaps it 
is simply naive to imagine that one could have a feminist idea of law 
that wasn't somehow tainted or dismissed. But denial has its virtues, 
even if it also has its risks. That is something I suspect that most of us 
practice in life as well as law. My form of denial is simply to say to 
those who ask (and to believe that they will take me seriously) that 
anti-feminism is anti-democratic. I tell them that feminism, for all its 
apparent radicalism to the public ear, is quite conventional. It is sim-
ply one of the latest of our national struggles to realize the great struc-
tural promises of our constitution. For, to tout and benefit from the 
superiority of some to others, is to flout the hopes of that constitution 
- that we would form a society founded not upon blood, but upon an 
idea. 120 Linda Kerber has explained that idea quite well: "[I] n the 
Anglo-American legal tradition, equality has always meant simultane-
ously common law and equity, sameness and difference shaped to au-
thentic equality in the world which living people inhabit. [This] has 
shifted over time as social relations between men and women have 
shifted. The principles remain steady and inviolate, but the work of 
maintaining them in our lives will have no end."121 
Yes, the relational is quite constitutional, I think, in life as well as 
law. 
120. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Republican Banquet in Chicago, Illinois (Dec. 10, 
1856), in LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 115-16 (Gore Vidal ed., 1992) 
("The 'central idea' in our political public opinion, at the beginning was, and until 
recently has continued to be, 'the equality of men."'). 
121. KERBER, supra note 16, at 310. 
